Russia-Africa summit: Putin casts himself as an anticolonial champion, Europe must respond with a fairer offer
In Moscow, Vladimir Putin has been hosting delegations from 48 African countries since Wednesday and presents himself as the continent's best partner against a West he calls colonial. For Paris and Europe, the answer can be neither contempt nor indignation alone, but a more credible offer.
Translation of an article originally published in French. Read in French
The facts
Russia is hosting its third summit with Africa in Moscow on 28 and 29 October, after Sochi in 2019 and Saint Petersburg in 2023. According to the Kremlin, quoted by AFP, 48 African countries have sent a delegation, 22 of them led by their head of state. The summit is co-chaired by Vladimir Putin and Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye, current chair of the African Union, Al Jazeera reports. The Qatari outlet notes that 43 leaders made the trip in 2019, and only 17 in 2023.
In his speech, Reuters reports, the Russian president accused the West, which he describes as colonial, of continuing to exploit the continent's resources and of using debt to hold back its development. He said he supported a greater role for Africa at the IMF and the World Bank, and promised more grain and fertiliser. According to AFP, Moscow says it has delivered 13 million tonnes of agricultural products to the continent since the start of the year, wants to produce medicines and vaccines there, and 33 documents are due to be signed, including a declaration on artificial intelligence.
The figures nonetheless call for a sense of proportion. According to Al Jazeera, trade between Russia and Africa exceeds 28 billion dollars, compared with around 16.8 billion in 2019, but it remains concentrated in a few countries and far below that of China or the European Union. Russian influence works mainly through security: a group of analysts cited by the outlet counts Russian missions or troops in at least nine African countries.
The positions at stake
For Moscow, this summit illustrates the advent of a "multipolar" world. Vladimir Putin claims, according to Reuters, that Russian companies process raw materials locally and create jobs, unlike what he calls neocolonial exploitation. This message resonates particularly in the Sahel. AFP points out that Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have distanced themselves from France and moved closer to Moscow, and that a meeting is planned with the head of Mali's transition, Assimi Goïta, whose regime relies on the Russian paramilitaries of Africa Corps.
On the eve of the summit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused France and "certain Western countries" of involving Ukrainian military personnel in sabotage operations in Mali, according to the TASS agency as relayed by Les Dépêches de Brazzaville. The newspaper notes that he presented no supporting evidence. In May, asked about similar allegations, a source at the Quai d'Orsay quoted by the Anadolu agency described them as "unfounded" and blamed the deterioration of security in Mali on a Russian policy it called "predatory".
Finally, a shadow hangs over the meeting. In an open letter published on 27 October, African officials of Amnesty International urge the leaders present to demand that Moscow end the deceptive and coercive recruitment of Africans sent to fight in Ukraine, practices which, according to the NGO, often amount to human trafficking. AFP reports that Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa have expressed concern about the fate of their nationals.
The argument of the governments that made the trip deserves a fair hearing. For many of them, going to Moscow does not mean aligning themselves, but diversifying their partners and carrying more weight with the major powers. The criticisms levelled at Western countries over the burden of debt, Africa's weak representation in international financial institutions or unkept aid promises are not an invention of the Kremlin.
The analysis
That is precisely why France would be wrong to respond with contempt or with indignation alone. The anticolonial rhetoric of a power waging a war of conquest in Ukraine, and whose forced recruitment of young Africans is denounced by a recognised NGO, contains an obvious contradiction. But contradiction is not enough to convince. Moscow thrives on real grievances, and on the space left by those who, for decades, confused partnership with tutelage.
The Gaullist tradition has always held two requirements together: respect for the sovereignty of states and fidelity to international law. Today it demands that Russia not be left with a monopoly on a just cause, that of an Africa better represented in global governance. It also demands a reminder that sovereignty is not won by replacing one dependence with another, especially when that dependence rests on paramilitaries rather than institutions.
Europe has assets that Moscow lacks: according to the figures reported by Al Jazeera, its trade with Africa weighs far more than Russia's. It still needs to turn that into a political offer. That means speaking as equals, giving concrete support to the reform of financial institutions that the Kremlin only promises in words, and linking development aid to the needs expressed by African societies themselves: health, education, agriculture, energy transition.
Conclusion
France could put forward a clear initiative at the next European Council: support for a greater weight for Africa at the IMF and the World Bank, treatment of the debt of the most vulnerable countries in return for investment in public services, and support for African states that are holding Moscow to account over the fate of their nationals. The question remains open: will Europe be able to offer Africa more than words, before others fill the void in its place?
Article written with the help of artificial intelligence.
The author
La Rédaction LSR — La rédaction de LSR Media.
