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Foreign interference: six months before the presidential election, the Senate arms democracy, but not enough

Since Tuesday the Senate has been examining a bill against foreign interference, while nearly a hundred operations have reportedly already targeted the presidential campaign, according to the Interior Minister. A useful, consensual text that nonetheless leaves out the essential issue: the responsibility of the platforms.

Translation of an article originally published in French. Read in French

By La Rédaction LSRPublished 20 October 2026 at 20:28· 5 min read
L'hémicycle du Sénat, au palais du Luxembourg à Paris, vu depuis le plateau et la tribune (2017).
L'hémicycle du Sénat, au palais du Luxembourg à Paris, vu depuis le plateau et la tribune (2017). — Credit : Photo : Soleil1409, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Six months before the presidential election, the government defended its bill "on the fight against foreign interference in democratic life" before the Senate on Tuesday 20 October. The figure put forward by Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez at the opening of the debate shows what is at stake: according to Public Sénat, nearly a hundred foreign digital operations have reportedly already targeted the campaign since the summer.

The facts

The text, adopted in committee on 14 October, consists of only a few articles. According to the summary published by the Senate, it creates an urgent judicial procedure (référé) allowing a judge to quickly halt the online spread of false information that harms the fundamental interests of the Nation. It extends the existing electoral référé to all elections, including local ones. Finally, it toughens the penalties set by the electoral code for spreading false news: up to three years in prison and a 45,000 euro fine, compared with one year and 15,000 euros today, and up to six years when the interference acts on behalf of a foreign power.

According to the report of the Senate law committee, Viginum, the state service responsible for detecting digital interference, identified four foreign operations during the municipal elections of March 2026, two of them pro-Russian. This summer, as LCP reported, the Paris prosecutor's office opened an investigation into possible Russian interference targeting Gabriel Attal and Édouard Philippe, after a similar procedure concerning Raphaël Glucksmann. These campaigns were then attributed, according to LCP, to the pro-Russian modus operandi known as "Matriochka".

France would be wrong to think itself safe; it is even a prime target. — Laurent Nuñez, in the Senate

The Romanian precedent haunts minds. The Senate report recalls that in 2024, a candidate polling at less than 1% four weeks before the vote came first in the first round with nearly 23%, before the election was annulled.

The positions at stake

In principle, the text enjoys consensus. But many consider it too modest. According to AFP, as published by Boursorama, the bill is seen as too limited given what is at stake in a presidential campaign. The minister himself acknowledged, according to Public Sénat, that it does not claim to deal with the threat on its own and comes to complement the existing arsenal.

The law committee, chaired by rapporteur Muriel Jourda (Les Républicains), refocused the référé on content spread by or on behalf of a foreign power or organisation, and required the judge to rule within 48 hours. The rapporteur for the foreign affairs committee, the Socialist Rachid Temal, proposed banning paid use of influencers during the campaign, strengthening checks on the origin of funds lent to candidates, and extending the protection period before an election from three to six months. Several senators, according to Public Sénat, also want to make platforms more accountable, and the centrist Laurent Lafon wishes to create an offence targeting developers of artificial intelligence whose models may have harmed democratic debate.

Another line of caution exists, that of civil liberties. In its opinion of 16 July, the Conseil d'État judged the mechanism proportionate, thanks to the involvement of a judge, adversarial proceedings and strict cumulative criteria: manifest falsity, and deliberate, massive and artificial dissemination. It did, however, note that the text went beyond foreign interference alone, which the committee has corrected.

The analysis

This debate raises the question at the right level, that of sovereignty. A presidential election is the moment when the Nation chooses, alone, who will embody it. When a foreign power buys views or imitates local news sites, it is a direct attack on national cohesion. The Gaullist tradition has always known this: independence is not defended only at the borders.

But the tool must be looked at clearly. The Conseil d'État itself expresses doubts about its effectiveness: a court decision, however fast, risks coming after the lie has spread, and the référé created in 2018 has been used only twice in nearly eight years, according to the Senate report. Tougher penalties against operators based outside France will have a limited deterrent effect. The heart of the problem lies elsewhere: in the business model of platforms that amplify whatever provokes a reaction, true or false. The Senate report cites a fake video of a coup d'état viewed around 14 million times, whose removal Meta reportedly refused.

The strongest response is therefore not only a criminal one. It requires firm enforcement of the European regulation on digital services, the European level being the only one able to carry weight against the major platforms. It also requires lasting public investment: resources for Viginum, for media literacy at school, for an independent press and a strong public information service. The best defence against manipulation remains an informed citizen.

Finally, care must be taken that the fight against false news never becomes an instrument against legitimate criticism. Refocusing on the foreign origin of content is a step in the right direction and must be maintained throughout the parliamentary shuttle.

Conclusion

This bill is useful, but it comes late and remains narrow. Between now and April, the question is simple: will the state give itself the means, human and European, to impose real transparency on platforms about the campaigns they amplify, or will it settle for punishing, after the fact, perpetrators who are out of reach?

Article written with the help of artificial intelligence.

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The author

La Rédaction LSR — La rédaction de LSR Media.