Sahel: the war between rival jihadists is spreading, and Europe can no longer look away

In northern Burkina Faso, a few dozen kilometres from the Malian and Nigerien borders, two jihadist armies are now fighting each other in the open. The Sahel branch of the Islamic State and JNIM, affiliated with al-Qaeda, are vying for the same land, the same roads and the same recruits. Meanwhile, civilians are paying the price for violence that keeps spreading, and Europe is looking elsewhere.

The facts: a deadly battle

According to RFI, fighting between the two groups has intensified since August along the border between Mali and Burkina Faso. The most violent clash reportedly took place on Friday 9 October near Ganadaouri, in Burkina Faso's Oudalan province. Several hundred people are said to have been killed, but no independent and reliable toll exists to date.

The Islamic State in the Sahel claims in its propaganda outlet, Al-Naba, to have killed more than 400 JNIM fighters. This figure has not been verified, and a researcher interviewed by RFI considers these tolls to be false. According to Mondafrique, JNIM reportedly won a first round at Tessit, on the Malian side, on 7 October, before suffering this setback two days later. The same outlet mentions reinforcements from Nigeria on the Islamic State side, which remains to be confirmed. JNIM, for its part, has not issued any official statement.

This Wednesday, Le Monde points out that this war between rival organisations, which began in 2019, is growing, and that the 9 October episode could be the deadliest of this conflict within the conflict.

A deeply unstable Malian context

These clashes come in a particularly violent year. In April, JNIM and the Tuareg separatists of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) carried out coordinated attacks in Mali, which notably cost the life of the defence minister, Al Jazeera recalls. On 6 October, the Malian army returned to Kidal, which the FLA had taken in April, after an air and ground campaign backed by Russia's Africa Corps. The FLA speaks of a « strategic and controlled » withdrawal.

According to Mondafrique, strikes by the Malian army and its Russian allies against JNIM positions may have indirectly benefited the Islamic State. The stakes of this struggle go beyond ideology: it is about controlling the routes through which fuel, artisanal gold and various kinds of trafficking pass.

The positions at stake

For the juntas in power in Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey, united in the Alliance of Sahel States, the recapture of Kidal proves that the choice of partnering with Moscow, after the departure of French forces, is paying off. Some observers also believe that jihadists killing each other means fewer fighters against national armies. The argument deserves a hearing: weakened by their rivalry, the two groups could lose offensive capacity.

But this reading has its limits. According to an Irsem researcher quoted by RFI, JNIM is more political and more open to negotiation, while the Islamic State in the Sahel follows a more uncompromising and more violent line, including towards civilians. If the latter prevails, the Sahel will not be safer; it could be less so. Interviewed by Al Jazeera, a Control Risks analyst also considers the recapture of Kidal more « symbolic » than « decisive ».

Analysis: a human crisis that can no longer be ignored

Behind the military communiqués are figures that should alarm every European government. According to UNHCR, quoted by UN News on 9 October, around 4 million people are forcibly displaced in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, twice as many as in 2020. More than 818,000 are refugees or asylum seekers. UNHCR's response plan for the Sahel is only 27% funded, forcing the agency to make difficult choices about essential services. OCHA, for its part, estimated in the spring that 11.4 million people needed critical food assistance in this area.

For France and Europe, indifference would be a mistake. First, because the sovereignty of the Sahel states, which we must respect, does not erase the duty of solidarity towards their peoples. Second, because, according to Mondafrique, the Islamic State is reportedly seeking to open a corridor towards the Gulf of Guinea: the stability of Benin, Togo and Ghana, close partners of Europe, is at stake. Finally, because every cut in humanitarian aid feeds poverty, armed recruitment and, ultimately, forced departures.

The departure of French soldiers ended an era. It must not end our responsibility. A Gaullist policy, founded on respect for nations and on multilateralism, would mean not confusing regimes with peoples, and acting where our action remains legitimate: humanitarian aid, support for coastal countries, backing for regional and UN mediation.

Conclusion: refinance the emergency, prepare for dialogue

One simple proposal could guide European action: quickly bring funding for the United Nations humanitarian plans for the Sahel to a level that allows essential services to be maintained, and make prevention in the Gulf of Guinea countries a priority of the Union's foreign policy. France, a permanent member of the Security Council, has the means to lead this initiative.

The question remains open: will Europe be able to take an interest in the Sahel other than when its soldiers are deployed there?

Article written with the help of artificial intelligence.